Security of subcarrier wave quantum key distribution against the
  collective beam-splitting attack by Kozubov, A. V. et al.
Security of subcarrier wave quantum key distribution against the collective
beam-splitting attack
A. V. Kozubov,1, ∗ A. A. Gaidash,1 A. V. Gleim,1 G. P. Miroshnichenko,1 and D. B. Horoshko2, 3
1Department of Photonics and Optical Information Technology, ITMO University, Saint Petersburg, Russia
2Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 8523, Physique des Lasers Atomes et Molecules (PhLAM), F-59000 Lille, France
3B. I. Stepanov Institute of Physics, NASB, Nezavisimosti Avenue 68, Minsk 220072, Belarus
(Dated: July 16, 2018)
We consider a subcarrier wave quantum key distribution (QKD) system, where the quantum en-
coding is carried by weak sidebands generated to a coherent optical beam by means of an electrooptic
phase modulation. We study the security of two protocols, B92 and BB84, against one of the most
powerful attacks on the systems of this class: the collective beam splitting attack. We show that
a subcarrier wave QKD system with realistic parameters is capable of distributing a cryptographic
key over large distances. We show also that a modification of the BB84 protocol, with discrimina-
tion of only one state in each basis, performs not worse than the original BB84 protocol for this
class of QKD systems, which brings a significant simplification to the development of cryprographic
networks on the basis of considered technique.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Growing interest to the quantum key distribution
(QKD) systems [1–3] in the last decades has led to emer-
gence of a large number of experimental works dedicated
to the development of reliable QKD setups suitable for
everyday operation in existing telecommunication net-
works. Among them stand subcarrier wave (SCW) QKD
systems, the most valuable feature of which is exception-
ally efficient use of the quantum channel bandwidth and
capability of signal multiplexing by adding independent
sets of quantum subcarriers to the same carrier wave. It
makes SCW QKD systems perfect candidates as back-
bone of multiuser quantum networks.
In the SCW QKD system a strong monochromatic
wave, produced by a laser, is modulated to produce weak
sidebands whose phase with respect to the strong coher-
ent wave encodes the quantum information. Various pro-
tocols can be realized with this technique, the most pop-
ular ones being the BB84 protocol [4], using four phase
values, and the B92 protocol [5], using just two phases.
A realization of the B92 protocol with phase modulation
has been demonstrated by Merolla group [6, 7]. A re-
alization of the BB84 protocol has been demonstrated
by the same group with the help of amplitude rather
than phase modulators [8]; the replacement of the phase
modulation by a more technically complicated amplitude
modulation being necessary for decoding all the states of
the protocol at the side of receiver. The latter approach,
combined with the employment of several microwave fre-
quencies in the amplitude modulators by the technique
of subcarrier multiplexing resulted recently in a signifi-
cant increase of the key generation rate [9]. It was shown
[10] that monitoring the intensity of the strong wave can
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provide additional security to the protocol, being a real-
ization of the method of “strong reference” [5], suggested
in the early days of quantum cryptography for fighting
the most dangerous attacks, and proven recently to pro-
vide unconditional security for QKD with weak coherent
states [11]. A variant of the BB84 protocol with phase
modulation, allowing the receiver to decode only one of
the two states in each basis, has been recently realized
by some of us [12].
Notwithstanding the large experimental effort for
building SCW QKD systems, the analysis of their se-
curity still requires special consideration. In this arti-
cle we explore the security of the B92 and BB84 proto-
cols against one but very powerful attack: the collective
beam-splitting (CBS) attack. We analyse this attack and
calculate the secure key generation rate for given proto-
cols in its presence. The CBS attack is not limited by the
employment of the strong reference, thus the obtained
result is quite general and remains valid even for strong-
reference-enhanced versions of the protocols. We show
also that the secure key generation rate for the BB84 pro-
tocol with one state decoding (BB84-OSD) is the same
as for BB84 with both states decoded, which allows the
developers of the QKD networks to employ a relatively
simple phase modulation in the future.
Our calculation of the secure key rate is based on the
well-known Devetak-Winter bound [2, 13], applicable to
the case of collective attacks in one-way protocols of QKD
with independent identically distributed information car-
riers, to which the considered protocols of SCW QKD be-
long. We employ the recently developed quantum model
of electro-optical phase modulation [14], which allows us
to deduce the states of sidebands in the quantum channel
after the modulation, and their states after the demodu-
lation before the detection. This model has an advantage
of being applicable in the case of relatively high modula-
tion index, where tens of sidebands contain non-negligible
amount of photons.
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2This paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a
description of the protocols implemented in SCW QKD
device and builds the model of the quantum channel. In
Section III we calculate the quantum bit error rate as
function of loss in the quantum channel, which take into
consideration the quantum efficiency and the dark count
rate of the photodetector. In Section IV we consider
the attacks on the protocols and in Section V we find
the secure key rate dependence on the channel length
for different sets of SCW QKD parameters. Section VI
concludes the article.
II. OPERATION PRINCIPLES OF SCW QKD
A. The setup and the protocols
We consider two protocols of SCW QKD sharing the
same experimental setup, which is schematically shown in
Fig. 1. The laser source produces a coherent monochro-
matic light beam with the optical frequency ω, serving
as the carrier wave of the setup. The sender Alice mod-
ulates this beam by means of a travelling-wave phase
modulator, with the frequency of the microwave field Ω
and its phase ϕA. As a result of phase modulation, the
field at the output of the modulator acquires sidebands
at frequencies ωk = ω + kΩ, where we limit ourselves to
2S sidebands and let the integer k to run in the limits
−S ≤ k ≤ S. The modulation index and the intensity
of the carrier wave are chosen so that the total num-
ber of photons in the sidebands is less than unity, thus
providing non-orthogonality of the used set of states, re-
quired by the no-cloning theorem, lying in the heart of
the QKD security. The phase ϕA is constant in a trans-
mission window of duration T , but changes randomly
within a predefined set in the next window. The value
of this phase is written on the relative phase between
the sidebands and the carrier wave, and thus encodes the
bit, sent by Alice. In this article we consider two proto-
cols, differing by the set of phases, used by Alice. The
B92 [5] protocol employs only two non-orthogonal states
and ϕA ∈ {0, pi}, encoding the logical 0 and 1 respec-
tively. The BB84 protocol [4] uses four states, split in
two bases: ϕA ∈ {0, pi} corresponds to the basis 0, while
ϕA ∈ {pi/2, 3pi/2} corresponds to the basis 1, the first
state of each basis encoding the logical 0, and the sec-
ond one encoding the logical 1. In both protocols the
carrier wave propagates together with the sidebands and
can serve as “strong reference”, which was suggested for
B92 protocol by its author Bennett [5], and can be ex-
tended to the BB84 protocol by analogy. Monitoring the
power of the strong reference helps to fight the attacks
employing measurement of the quantum carriers in the
quantum channel and suppression of them in the case of
unfavorable outcome, like the photon number splitting
(PNS) attack and the unambiguous state discrimination
(USD) attack. However, in the present article we do not
consider the additional enhancement of security provided
FIG. 1. Schematic presentation of the SCW QKD setup.
PSM is a phase modulator; SF is a spectral filter, remov-
ing the central frequency; SPD is the single photon detector.
The diagrams in circles show the spectrum in the correspond-
ing part of the setup. Only two sidebands are shown in the
spectra for simplicity.
by the strong reference method, leaving it to a separate
study.
The encoded states together with the carrier wave are
sent to the receiver Bob, who applies a similar phase mod-
ulation to the received beam with the microwave phase
ϕB in each transmission window, and then directs all the
sidebands to a single-photon detector (SPD). The set of
phases used by Bob is the same as that of Alice in both
protocols. The decoding is based on the fact, that each
time Alice and Bob use different phases from the same
set {0, pi} or {pi/2, 3pi/2}, so that ϕA − ϕB = ±pi, the
sidebands after the Bob’s modulator are in the vacuum
state and the SPD produces no click, except for dark
counts. In the B92 protocol Bob decodes a bit value in
the transmission windows where his SPD clicks, and this
value corresponds to his phase ϕB . In the BB84-OSD
protocol Bob waits while Alice announces the bases used
for each bit by a public channel, and then decodes the
bit value in the transmission windows where he used the
same basis and where his SPD clicked, this value again
corresponding to his phase ϕB . In this protocol Bob de-
codes only one state of the basis. For example, if Alice
uses ϕA = 0, Bob decodes this bit only if he uses the
phase ϕB = 0. The phase ϕB = pi, however belonging
to the same basis, does not result (in the ideal case) in a
click of Bob’s detector. We show in Sec. V that this mod-
ification of the BB84 protocol does not affect the secure
key generation rate.
B. The secure key generation rate
The described above protocols belong to the class of
one-way protocols of QKD with independent identically
distributed information carriers [2]. The secure key gen-
eration rate K for the protocols of this class in the
presence of collective attacks is lower bounded by the
Devetak-Winter bound [2, 13]:
K = νSPB
[
1− leakEC(Q)−max
E
χ(A : E)
]
, (1)
3where νS is the repetition rate, in our case νS = T
−1; PB
is the probability of successful decoding and accepting a
bit in one transmission window; Q is the quantum bit er-
ror rate (QBER), the probability that a bit, accepted by
Bob is erroneous; leakEC(Q) is the amount of information
revealed by Alice by the public channel for the sake of
the error correction, which depends on QBER and is lim-
ited by the Shannon bound: leakEC(Q) ≥ h(Q), where
h(Q) = −Q log2Q − (1 − Q) log2(1 − Q) is the binary
Shannon entropy.
The quantity χ(A : E) in Eq. (1) is the Holevo infor-
mation [15], giving the upper bound for the information
accessible to the eavesdropper Eve in a given collective
attack. In this class of attacks Eve realizes interaction
of her ancilla with each information carrier in the quan-
tum channel (light in one transmission window in our
case), stores the ancillas for the entire transmitted block
in a quantum memory, and waits while Alice and Bob
finish the post-processing of their key. Afterwards Eve
measures collectively all the ancillas of the block, taking
into account all the information collected from the pub-
lic channel. The best measurement cannot give her more
information (per bit) than
χ(A : E) = S(ρ)−
∑
k
pkS(ρk), (2)
where the index k enumerates the possible states in the
quantum channel, ρk is the state of the ancilla under
condition that kth state was attacked, pk is the weight of
the kth state, ρ =
∑
k pkρk is the unconditional state of
ancilla, and S(ρ) = −Tr{ρ log2 ρ} is the von Neumann
entropy. The accessible information in Eq. (1) is maxi-
mized over all possible attacks by Eve, which is almost
impossible to realize by considering various attacks one
by one. A different approach to finding the secure key
rate is connected to considering an equivalent protocol of
entanglement distillation [16], and proving thus the un-
conditional security of the given protocol. Unfortunately,
such an approach has not been yet applied to the SCW
QKD without strong reference. In Sec. IV we calcu-
late the quantity, Eq. (2), for just one, but very powerful
attack, the CBS attack.
C. The quantum channel
The information channel between Alice and Bob, in-
cluding quantum encoding, transmission via quantum
channel, and quantum decoding, for each choice of basis
has two input values, Alice’s bit x = 0, 1, and three out-
put values, Bob’s bit y = 0, 1 and the inconclusive result
y = 2 where Bob’s detector does not click. The absence
of click is caused by the vacuum component in the state
of the sidebands, and also by the possibility of destruc-
tive interference in the case Bob guesses the basis but
not the state in BB84-OSD. The channel is completely
determined by the matrix P (y|x), the conditional prob-
ability of the Bob’s outcome y when Alice sends x. We
accept that Alice’s bit is random and its two values are
equiprobable, which is known to maximize the channel
capacity.
In the case where the probabilities of error and loss
are independent of the input values, such a channel repre-
sents a binary symmetric error and erasure (BSEE) chan-
nel [17]. For such a channel we can write E = P (0|1) =
P (1|0), G = P (2|0) = P (2|1), and these two parameters
determine completely the channel. The diagram of this
channel is shown in Fig. 2a and its capacity is given by
C = 1−G− (1−G) log2(1−G) + E log2(E) +
+ (1−G− E) log2(1−G− E). (3)
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FIG. 2. Diagrams of (a) the binary symmetric error and era-
sure channel and (b) the equivalent cascade of a symmetric
binary channel and an erasure channel. The question mark
denotes the inconclusive result.
It should be noted, that the “error probability” E of
BSEE channel is not the QBER value Q, entering Eq. (1),
because the latter is the probability of error under con-
dition of conclusive measurement outcome. To find the
value of QBER, we represent BSEE channel as two cas-
caded channels [17]: a symmetric binary channel with er-
ror probability Q and an erasure channel with the erasure
probability G′, see Fig. 2b. It is easy to find that the two
representations are equivalent, i.e, have the same matrix
P (y|x), if G′ = G and Q(1−G) = E. It is easy to verify
also that the capacity of the channel, given by Eq. (3),
can be rewritten as C = C1C2, where C1 = 1−h(Q) is the
capacity of the binary symmetric channel, and C2 = 1−G
is the capacity of the erasure channel. In the next section
we calculate the values of E and G, and as consequence,
the QBER, from the explicit expressions for the quantum
states, used in the SCW QKD system.
III. QUANTUM BIT ERROR RATE
The states of the multimode optical field at the en-
trance to the quantum channel can be found by the quan-
tum model of electro-optical phase modulator developed
in Ref. [14]. The model takes into consideration 2S + 1
modes of the optical field with frequencies ω+kΩ, where
the integer k varies as −S ≤ k ≤ S. The input state of
the Alice’s modulator is |√µ0〉0⊗|vac〉SB , where |vac〉SB
is the vacuum state of the sidebands and |√µ0〉0 is a co-
herent state of the carrier wave with the amplitude
√
µ0,
4determined by the average number of photons in a trans-
mission window: µ0 = PT/(~ω), P being the power of
the laser beam. The phase of the coherent state of the
carrier wave is accepted to be zero and all other phases
are calculated with respect to this phase. The state of
the field at the output of the modulator is a multimode
coherent state
|ψ0(ϕA)〉 =
S⊗
k=−S
|αk(ϕA)〉k, (4)
with the coherent amplitudes
αk(ϕA) =
√
µ0d
S
0k(β)e
−i(θ1+ϕA)k, (5)
where θ1 is a constant phase and d
S
nk(β) is the Wigner
d-function, appearing in the quantum theory of angular
momentum [18]. The argument of the d-function β is
determined by the modulation index m, and disregarding
the dispersion of the modulator medium this dependence
can be written as [14]:
β =
2m
2S + 1
. (6)
A remarkable property of the d-function is its asymptotic
form [18]
dSnk(m/S) −→
S→∞
Jn−k(m), (7)
where Jn(x) is the Bessel function of the first kind. This
asymptotic form corresponds to a conventional descrip-
tion of the phase modulation with an infinite number of
sidebands, leading in the quantum case to unphysical re-
sults because of appearance of negative frequencies, see
discussion in Ref. [19].
After passing the distance L in the quantum channel
(optical fiber), the states of all spectral components are
attenuated. The transmission coefficient of the quantum
channel is η(L) = 10−ξL/10, where ξ is the fibre loss
per unit length. The state of the optical field in one
transmission window at the entrance to the Bob’s module
is
|ψL(ϕA)〉 =
S⊗
k=−S
|
√
η(L)αk(ϕA)〉k. (8)
The microwave field in the Bob’s phase modulator has
the same frequency Ω as that of the Alice’s one, but a dif-
ferent phase ϕ. Additional field is produced in this mod-
ulator on the same sideband frequencies ω + kΩ, which
interferes with the field already present on these frequen-
cies. The resulting state of the field is a multimode co-
herent state [14]
|ψB(ϕA, ϕ)〉 =
S⊗
k=−S
|α′k(ϕA, ϕ)〉k, (9)
with the coherent amplitudes
α′k(ϕA, ϕ) =
√
µ0η(L)d
S
0k(β
′)e−i(θ2+ϕA+ϕ)k, (10)
where the new argument of the d-function is determined
by the relation
cosβ′ = cos2 β − sin2 β cos (ϕA − ϕ+ ϕ0) , (11)
while θ2 and ϕ0 are some constant phases determined
by the construction of the phase modulator [14]. Equa-
tion (11) shows that to achieve constructive interference
on the sidebands, Bob should use ϕ0 as offset for his
phase, and apply in his modulator the microwave phase
ϕ = ϕ0 + ϕB . Then, for ϕA − ϕB = 0, the argument of
the d-function doubles: β′ = 2β, while for ϕA−ϕB = ±pi
it vanishes: β′ = 0. Since dS0k(0) = δ0k, a zero argument
corresponds to the presence of photons only on the carrier
frequency, all the sidebands being in the vacuum state.
The optical losses in the Bob’s module can be described
by the transmittance coefficient ηB . These losses can be
taken into account by replacing the amplitudes deter-
mined by Eq. (10) with the following ones:
α¯k(ϕA, ϕB) =
√
µ0η(L)ηBd
S
0k(β
′)e−i(θ3+ϕA+ϕB)k, (12)
where θ3 = θ2 + ϕ0. It is unimportant if some of the
optical losses took place before the phase modulation,
during or after it, as soon as they are the same for all
spectral components.
The spectral filtering in the Bob’s module aims at re-
moving the relatively strong carrier wave. Unfortunately,
in a practical QKD system this wave can be only atten-
uated by the factor ϑ  1, resulting in a replacement
α¯0(ϕA, ϕB)→
√
ϑα¯0(ϕA, ϕB).
Thus, the average number of photons, arriving at the
Bob’s detector in the transmission window T is given
by the average total number of photons at all spectral
components
nph(ϕA, ϕB) = ϑ|α¯0(ϕA, ϕB)|2 +
∑
k 6=0
|α¯k(ϕA, ϕB)|2
= µ0η(L)ηB
(
1− (1− ϑ)|dS00(β′)|2
)
, (13)
where we have used the property of the d-functions [18]
S∑
k=−S
dSnk(β)
(
dSlk(β)
)∗
= δnl, (14)
meaning that dSnk(β) is a unitary matrix with respect to
its lower indices.
For the values nph  1, typical for a long-distance
QKD line, the probability for the SPD to produce a click
in the window T is [20]
Pph(ϕA, ϕB) =
(
ηD
nph(ϕA, ϕB)
T
+ γdark
)
∆t, (15)
where ηD is the detector quantum efficiency, γdark is the
dark count rate, and ∆t = T for the continuous operation
5of the detector, but if a gating time shorter than T is
used, then ∆t is equal to the gating time of the detector.
Now we can calculate the parameters of the BSEE
channel between Alice and Bob. These parameters are
the same for both protocols B92 and BB84-OSD, and are
given by the following relations
Pdet(0, pi + ∆ϕ) = E, (16)
Pdet(0,∆ϕ)) = 1− E −G, (17)
where the phase ∆ϕ describes slight phase instability,
caused, for instance, by jitter or phase mismatch due to
non-perfect synchronization.
The QBER Q = E/(1 − G) can be calculated from
Eqs. (13,15,16,17) as function of the distance L. The
calculation can be simplified by considering a sufficiently
high number of sidebands S  10 and taking the limit,
given by Eq. (7).
For calculations we use the experimental parameters
from one of the regimes realized in Ref. [12]: T = 10
ns, µ0 = 4, m = 0.319, νS = 100 MHz, ∆ϕ = 5
◦,
10 lg ηB = 6.4 dB, ϑ = 10
−3. Two different detectors are
considered: a superconducting nanowire single-photon
detector (SNSPD) with ηD = 0.2, γdark = 20 Hz, op-
erating in the continuous regime, and an avalanche pho-
todiode (APD): ηD = 0.125, γdark = 400 Hz, operating
in the gated regime with the gating time ∆t = 4 ns.
In Fig.3 we show the dependence of QBER on the op-
tical loss ξL for two considered detectors.
FIG. 3. QBER dependence on the channel loss in SCW QKD
system
For relatively low loss, while the counting rate well
surpasses the dark count rate, the QBER is mainly de-
termined by the phase instability and imperfect filtering
of the carrier wave. The loss at which the counting rate
becomes comparable to γdark is the maximal loss for a
given QKD system, because above this value the QBER
increases rapidly, reaching values, not suitable for the
error correction.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CBS ATTACK
A. The possible attacks
After Alice and Bob have successfully generated a
block of shared bits of length N , containing some errors
(the raw key), they perform error correction by disclos-
ing N · leakEC(Q) bits, this number depending on their
error-correcting protocol, but lower limited by N · h(Q).
After having corrected all the errors they do privacy am-
plification by shortening their block by means of a hash
function, with the aim to eliminate almost totally the po-
tential knowledge of Eve on the shorter block (the final
key). The amount to which the block should be shortened
is determined by Eq. (1), where the second term in the
square brackets corresponds to the information disclosed
during the error correction stage, while the third term in
the squire brackets corresponds to the upper estimate of
potential information of Eve on the key.
To obtain a good upper estimate of the Eve’s informa-
tion, one needs to consider explicitly various attacks on
the QKD line. The general scenario of the attack is as
follows: Eve replaces the communication line character-
ized by the error rate Q0 ≤ Q and the loss η by a per-
fect errorless and lossless line and employs an eavesdrop-
ping procedure on the information carriers, introducing
the same amount of error and loss as before the replace-
ment, thus hiding her intrusion from the legitimate users,
who monitor the error rate and the loss in the channel.
The attacks suitable for modelling can be individual or
collective, depending on the number of information car-
riers attacked at once. The most important individual
attacks are the intercept-resend (IR) attack, introducing
errors, but no loss [1], and three zero-error attacks, in-
troducing only loss but no error [2]: the PNS attack, the
USD attack, and the individual beam-splitting (IBS) at-
tack. The most important collective attacks include the
CBS attack, being a quantum-memory-enhanced version
of the IBS attack, and the asymmetric cloning (AC) at-
tack, consisting in entangling an ancillary system to the
information carrier by means of an asymmetric cloning
machine [21] or an asymmetric universal entangling ma-
chine [22]. The latter attack introduces errors but no
loss.
The analysis of the previous section shows that in a
SCW QKD system almost no error is caused by the trans-
mission line, so that Q0 ≈ 0. In the “calibrated devices”
approach to the security analysis [2] we accept that the
Bob’s module is calibrated for errors and loss, and Eve
has no access to its performance. Then the IR and AC
attacks, introducing errors, can be rather easily detected
by enhancement of the measured value of QBER. The
zero-error PNS and USD attacks require a suppression
of the signal and the carrier wave in the case of unsuc-
cessful measurement outcome, and can be countered by
monitoring the power of the carrier wave, which is the
essence of the “strong reference” method [5, 11]. The
CBS attack always outperforms the IBS attack, which is
6its particular case, and therefore the CBS attack, in no
way detectable, seems to be the most important for the
security analysis of the SCW QKD system, serving the
point of reference for all other attacks.
B. The CBS attack
In the CBS attack Eve inserts a beam splitter with the
transmission η(L) in the very beginning of the transmis-
sion line and sends the transmitted light to Bob via a loss-
less line, keeping the reflected light in a quantum mem-
ory, writing each window of duration T to a separate cell
of memory. After the announcement of bases (in BB84-
OSD) and error correction performed by the legitimate
users for a block of bits, she discards (in BB84-OSD) the
memory cells, corresponding to windows where the bases
used by Alice and Bob do not coincide and makes a col-
lective measurement of the rest of the cells. Below we
calculate the Holevo information, Eq. (2), for the state
of the information carrier in the quantum channel of an
SCW QKD system.
As follows from the quantum consideration of the beam
splitter [23], the state of the transmitted beam in the
window T is given by Eq. (8) and is identical to one
which should arrive at Bob’s module in the absence of
eavesdropping, while the state of the reflected beam in
the same window is
|ψE(ϕA)〉 =
S⊗
k=−S
|
√
η¯(L)αk(ϕA)〉k, (18)
where η¯(L) = 1 − η(L) and the phase ϕA is a random
member of the set, corresponding to the used protocol.
In the B92 protocol for each cell Eve needs to dis-
tinguish only two states, |ψE(0)〉 and |ψE(pi)〉. In the
BB84-OSD protocol, for the cells corresponding to Al-
ice’s choice of basis {pi/2, 3pi/2}, Eve shifts the phase of
the kth sideband by pik/2, which is realized by a unitary
rotation of the state Eq. (18) with the evolution operator
U = exp
(
ipi
2
S∑
k=−S
ka†kak
)
(19)
where ak is the photon annihilation operator for the kth
sideband. A unitary rotation does not change the ac-
cessible information, thus, Eve needs to distinguish the
same two states as in the B92 protocol.
Since the two states to be distinguished are pure, the
Holevo information, Eq. (2) is given by the von Neumann
entropy of the mixed state
ρ =
1
2
|ψE(0)〉〈ψE(0)|+ 1
2
|ψE(pi)〉〈ψE(pi)|. (20)
The von Neumann entropy of a density operator is the
Shannon entropy of its eigenvalues. The eigenvalues of
operator ρ are
λ1,2 =
1
2
(1± |ψ(0, pi)|) (21)
where the state overlap ψ(ϕ1, ϕ2) is calculated as
ψ(ϕ1, ϕ2) = 〈ψE(ϕ1)|ψE(ϕ2)〉 = (22)
=
S∏
k=−S
k〈
√
η¯(L) · αk(ϕ1)|
√
η¯(L) · αk(ϕ2)〉k
Using the formula for the scalar product of two coherent
states
〈α|β〉 = exp
(
−1
2
(|α|2 + |β|2) + α∗β
)
we obtain
ψ(ϕ1, ϕ2) (23)
= exp
[
− η¯(L)
2
S∑
k=−S
(|αk(ϕ1)|2 + |αk(ϕ2)|2 − 2α∗k(ϕ1)αk(ϕ2))
]
= exp
[
−µ0η¯(L)
S∑
k=−S
|dS0k(β)|2
(
1− ei(ϕ1−ϕ2)k
)]
,
where we have employed Eq. (5). Using the properties of
d-functions, we find
S∑
k=−S
|dS0k(β)|2
(
1− ei(ϕ1−ϕ2)k
)
= 1− dS00(β−), (24)
where the angle β− is determined by the relation
cos(β−) = cos2(β) + sin2(β) · cos(ϕ1 − ϕ2). (25)
Finally,
ψ(ϕ1, ϕ2) = exp
[−µ0η¯(L) (1− dS00(β−))] . (26)
where for ϕ1 − ϕ2 = ±pi we need to substitute β− = 2β.
Thus, for both the B92 and the BB84-OSD protocols
we obtain the Holevo information
χ(A : E) = h
(
1
2
(1− exp [−µ0η¯(L) (1− dS00(2β))]) .
(27)
V. THE SECURE KEY RATE
A. Rate dependence on the loss
Now we have all the necessary dependencies to calcu-
late the secure key rate, determined by Eq. (1). The
probability PB for decoding and accepting a bit is given
by PB = (1−G)f , where f is the fraction of data where
Bob guessed correctly the basis, equal to 12 for the BB84-
OSD protocol and to 1 for the B92 protocol, and 1−G is
the probabilty of photodetection in the window T and is
determined by Eqs. (16,17). As we have seen in the pre-
vious sections, all the functions, entering the right hand
side of Eq. (1) are the same for the BB84-OSD and the
7B92 protocols, except for f . Thus, the secure key rate
for the B92 protocol is always twice that for the BB84-
OSD protocol, as far as we restrict our analysis to a CBS
attack. For this reason we illustrate only the case of the
latter protocol.
In Fig. 4 we show the dependence of the secure key
rate on the channel loss ξL for the same setting with
two detectors as in Sec. III. The corresponding distance
can be easily calculated using the value ξ = 0.18 dB/km
typical for the telecommunication fibre.
FIG. 4. Secure key rate dependence on channel loss in SCW
QKD system
We note that for rather low repetition rate, T−1 = 100
MHz, we can achieve high values of distances and secure
key rates. In spite of low secure distances with APD it is
still an effective solution for up to 100 km fiber lines due
to its easier maintenance compared to SNSPD.
B. Optimal modulation depth
The depth of the phase modulation in the Alice’s mod-
ule determines the total number of photons in the side-
bands of the field, entering the communication line and
being the object of the Eve’s attack. The mean photon
number in all the sidebands is an important parameter,
commonly used for characterizing the regime of a QKD
system [1, 2] and it can be found as following:
µ =
∑
k 6=0
|αk(ϕA)|2 = µ0 ·(1−|dS00(β)|2) ≈ µ0 ·(1−J0(m)2)
(28)
where the last expression is the asymptotic form for a
sufficiently large number of sidebands.
Higher values of µ correspond to higher counting rate
of the Bob’s detector and are very attractive from the
practical point of view. However, the information avail-
able to Eve is also growing with µ, reaching 100 % in
the limit where µ  1 and the states of the sidebands
corresponding to different values of ϕA become almost
orthogonal.
The optimal value of the modulation depth m and
therefore µ can be found by considering the key genera-
tion rate as function K(µ,L) and finding the value µ(L)
which maximizes this function for a given L. The numer-
ically found dependence is presented in Fig. 5. According
to it given value of µ was chosen.
FIG. 5. Mean photon number dependence on losses in the
channel providing the maximum value of the secret key rate
We see that the practical value for a long-distance
QKD with SNSPD is µ = 0.2, and higher values of
the mean photon number, considered in the literature
[10, 24], are not secure against the CBS attack.
C. Secure key rate of BB84 versus BB84-OSD
Let us divide all the sidebands of the field in a SCW
QKD system into the upper sidebands with frequencies
ω + kΩ, k ∈ [1, S] and the lower sidebands with frequen-
cies ω + kΩ, k ∈ [−S,−1].
The demodulation process in the Bob’s module, can be
described by a demodulation operator D(ϕB), mapping
the state arriving to his module, Eq. (8), to the state
given by Eq. (9). In the case ϕB = 0 and if the basis is
guessed correctly, this mapping is
D(0)|ψL(0)〉 = |µs〉+ ⊗ |µs〉− ⊗ |µ¯c〉0, (29)
D(0)|ψL(pi)〉 = |vac〉+ ⊗ |vac〉− ⊗ |µ¯〉0, (30)
where |µs〉+ and |µs〉− are multimode coherent states of
upper and lower sidebands respectively with the same
8mean photon number µs each, defined as
|µs〉+ =
S⊗
k=1
|α′k(0, ϕ0)〉k, (31)
|µs〉− =
−1⊗
k=−S
|α′k(0, ϕ0)〉k, (32)
while |µ¯c〉0 and |µ¯〉0 are coherent states of the carrier
wave with the mean photon numbers µ¯c = |α′0(0, ϕ0)|2
and µ¯ = |α′0(pi, ϕ0)|2 respectively. It can be obtained
from Eq. (10) that µ¯ = µ¯c + 2µs, which has a simple
physical meaning: the demodulation process preserves
the total number of photons in the field.
Let us consider a modification of the protocol BB84-
OSD, where Bob has two detectors: one for the upper
sidebands and one for the lower ones, and applies a de-
modulation operator D′(ϕB) to the state of the field ar-
riving to his module, Eq. (8), directing the photons either
to the upper sidebands or to the lower ones depending
on the phase ϕB (under condition he uses the same basis
as Alice). Here we consider only operators resulting in a
linear transformation of the field, and therefore mapping
coherent states onto coherent ones. In the case ϕB = 0
the mapping provided by the demodulation should be as
follows:
D′(0)|ψL(0)〉 = |µ′s〉+ ⊗ |vac〉− ⊗ |µ¯′c〉0, (33)
D′(0)|ψL(pi)〉 = |vac〉+ ⊗ |µ′s〉− ⊗ |µ¯′c〉0, (34)
where all the states are coherent and the mean numbers
of photons are determined by their arguments. In this
case Bob can distinguish the cases of ϕa = 0 and ϕa = pi
by observing a click on the corresponding detector, which
would correspond to a realization of the BB84 protocol.
Let us calculate the corresponding counting rate.
From the unitarity of the operators D(ϕB) and D
′(ϕB)
we have
〈ψL(pi)|D†(0)D(0)|ψL(0)〉 = 〈ψL(pi)|D′†(0)D′(0)|ψL(0)〉,
(35)
wherefrom, with the help of Eqs. (29,30,33,34), we obtain
exp
{
−µs − 1
2
(√
µ¯−√µ¯c
)2}
= exp {−µ′s} (36)
or
µ′s = µs +
1
2
(√
µ¯−
√
µ¯− 2µs
)2
≈ µs + µ
2
s
2µ¯
. (37)
We see, that in the case of low modulation index, where
µs/µ¯  1, the average number of photons in the side-
bands for the BB84 protocol is almost the same as for
BB84-OSD, µ′s ≈ µs. It means that the Bob’s detectors
in BB84 click with the rate ηBµ
′
s each, while in the BB84-
OSD protocol (with a perfect suppression of the carrier
wave) the only detector clicks with the rate 2ηBµs, the
total count rate being the same for two protocols.
Thus, in the regime of low modulation index there is no
reason to install the second detector and employ sophisti-
cated modulation/demodulation techniques for decoding
both states of the same basis. The protocol BB84-OSD
performs not worse than BB84 and is technically signif-
icantly simpler. For the same reasons an increase of the
number of bases or the number of phases in each basis is
not expected to increase the secure key rate [25].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have calculated the secure key gener-
ation rate for two protocols of SCW QKD in the pres-
ence of the CBS attack in the quantum channel and have
shown that a SCW QKD system allows a secure distri-
bution of cryptographic key over large distances. It was
shown that the optimal mean photon number value in the
system is µ ≈ 0.2. We have found that the main limiting
factors for a long distance communication are the dark
counts of photodetector and the fraction of photons re-
maining at the carrier frequency that reach the detector.
It should be noted that for a more accurate QBER esti-
mations a more advanced model of the quantum channel
can be considered, for instance, including the partial loss
of coherence between the sidebands propagating in the
fibre.
We have shown also that the version of the BB84 pro-
tocol with detection of just one of the states in each basis
has a performance not worse than that of the full BB84
protocol. Also, the key generation rate of the B92 pro-
tocol is double that of the BB84 protocol, as long as the
analysis of attacks is limited to the CBS attack. It is
possible, that other attacks, like USD attack, may be
more successful against B92, which uses lesser number of
states, than against BB84. Individual attacks on SCW
QKD system will be a subject of a separate study.
The obtained results are important for constructing
long-distance QKD links and multiuser quantum net-
works using SCW QKD instrumentation: the possibility
of harnessing the ultra-high bandwidth for QKD is com-
patible with the existing fiber optical infrastructures.
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